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CRIMINAL LAW-JUVENILE

DELINQUENCY-CONTRIBUTING SURVIVES
CONSTITUTIONAL ATTACK: CONFUSION OR
CERTAINTY
The defendants were indicted for contributing to the delinquency of minors.1 Specifically, they were indicted for providing
non-intoxicating beer to minors and engaging in sexual relations
with minors. Pursuant to a motion by the defendants, the trial
court quashed the indictments on the ground that the statute was
unconstitutionally vague.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals considered on
certification whether the allegations in the indictment charged a
violation of the contributing statute and whether the provisions of
that statute were void by reason of vagueness.' Held, reversed. The
court stated that by considering the contributing statute together
with the statutory definition of a delinquent child,3 excluding two
subsections of the latter definition,4 the West Virginia ContributW.VA. CODE ANN. § 49-7-7 (1966) provides:
A person who by any act or omission contributes to, encourages or tends
to cause the delinquency or neglect of any child, shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not to exceed
five hundred dollars, or imprisoned in the county jail for a period not
exceeding one year or both.
2 State v. Flinn, 208 S.E.2d 538, 541 (W.Va. 1974).
W.VA. CODE ANN. § 49-1-4 (1966) provides:
"Delinquent child" means a person under the age of eighteen years who:
(1) Violates a law or municipal ordinance;
(2) Commits an act which if committed by an adult would be a crime not
punishable by death or life imprisonment;
(3) Is incorrigible, ungovernable or habitually disobedient and beyond the
control of his parent, guardian, or other custodian;
(4) Is habitually truant;
(5) Without just cause and without the consent of his parent, guardian,
or other custodian, repeatedly deserts his home or place of abode;
(6) Engages in an occupation which is in violation of law;
(7) Associates with immoral or vicious persons;
(8) Frequents a place the existence of which is in violation of law;
(9) Deports himself so as to wilfully injure or endanger the morals or
health of himself or others.
4 Id. §§ 7,9.
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ing Statute was not void for being unconstitutionally vague. State
v. Flinn, 208 S.E.2d 538 (W. Va. 1974).
Statutes placing criminal sanctions upon those who contribute to the delinquency of minors have been adopted by almost
every state in the union.5 Since delinquency was unknown at common law,' the crime of "contributing" to delinquency could not
have constituted a violation of common law. Therefore, any definition of "contributing" must come from statutory enactments.,
Apparently, the purpose for which the contributing statutes
are presently used is open to substantial question.' One ostensible
purpose for enacting statutory prohibitions against contributing to
the delinquency of minors was to deter parents from either neglecting or corrupting their own children.2 However, this premise has
been criticized. The most comprehensive study of the merits of
punishing parents found that such punishment had no effect whatsoever on the curbing of delinquency. 0 Further, considerable doubt
exists as to the worth of contributing statutes to our criminal
I "Contributing" statutes are found in virtually every state of the
union and embrace a wide variety of prohibited acts. Granting jurisdiction to the juvenile court, the criminal court, or to both courts concurrently, these statutes make it a crime to 'contribute' to the delinquency
or neglect or dependence of a child under a given age, normally, up to
the age at which juvenile court jurisdiction ceases.
Paulsen, The Legal Framework for Child Protection, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 679, 690
(1965).
State v. Dunn, 53 Ore. 304, 309, 99 P. 278, 280 (1909).
Id.
"[The contributing statute] is used against persons other than parents.
However, in such cases it is almost invariably used as a substitute for another, more
appropriate statute. . . . The contributing statute is not essential to the proper
prosecution of such cases." S. RUBIN, CRIME AND JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 37 (2d ed.
1961).
' There are those who think that there is a simple cure for juvenile
delinquency. Since delinquency starts in the home (they say) and parents
are responsible for the quality of home life (evidently), one would make
the parents responsible in law, and hence punishable if the home causes
or fails to prevent a child's delinquency. Such punishment, or its threat,
will deter delinquency.
Id. at 35.
10 Judge Paul W. Alexander, of Toledo, Ohio, conducted the most comprehensive study of the merit of punishing parents for the crime of contributing to the
delinquency of their children. During a ten year period he heard over a thousand
contributing cases. One-half of the defendants were parents, and three-fourths of
them pleaded guilty or were found guilty. Judge Alexander found no evidence that
punishing parents had any effect whatsoever on curbing delinquency. Id. at 96.
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justice system." Such statutes have been disavowed by authorities
in the area, and experience has demonstrated that such statutes
are almost invariably invoked in situations dealt with by other
statutory provisions, especially those statutes governing sexual offenses.12 Finally, wide legal skepticism exists as to the constitutionality of contributing statutes, 3 due to the problem of adequately
defining adult criminality in the area of juvenile delinquency."
The ineffectiveness, and at times the counterproductivity, of
such statutes has led to an almost universal rejection of contributing statutes by organizations whose primary function is legislative
revision. The drafters of the Model Penal Code have proposed
legislation concerning the endangering of the welfare of children,'"
but the words "contribute to the delinquency" or "corrupt the
morals" of a child are not included in that or any other provision
of the Model Penal Code. Similarly, both the Standard Juvenile
Court Act of 1949 and the Standard Act of 1959 have excluded
contributing statutes from their provisions,"6 and the United States
Children's Bureau has advocated the elimination of contributing
statutes."7
" The general

criticism is made that [a]s long as "contributing"
statutes are on the books, the danger exists that they will be used, and
when they are used, the danger exists-is almost inevitable-that they will
be abused. It would be the better part of wisdom for the legislatures to
repeal these laws, for they cannot be safely regarded as statutes which
are harmless and may be ignored.
Id. at 42.
"

MODEL PENAL CODE

§ 207.13, Comment 1 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).

"The formulations of the contributing statutes are imprecise, and this
vagueness may raise serious constitutional questions." Paulsen, supra note 5, at
691.
1 "It is one thing to give broad scope to an authority to promote the welfare
of children, but quite another thing to give a criminal court equivalent latitude in
defining crimes for which adults shall be punished. The vagueness of current statutes in the field presents serious constitutionalproblems. . . " (emphasis added).
MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.13, Comment 1 at 184 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959)
"

" MODEL PENAL CODE

§ 207.13 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959) provides: "A parent,

guardian, or other person supervising the welfare of a child under 18 commits a
misdemeanor if he knowingly endangers the child's physical or moral welfare by
violating a legal duty of care, protection or support." This section is the only'section
within the Model Penal Code that deals with the duties of a parent to a child.
"[Ilts significance lies as much in what it does not make criminal as in what it
does penalize. Notably, it will not be an offense under this or any other Section of
the Code to 'contribute to the delinquency' or 'corrupt the morals' of a child .
Id. Comment 1 at 183.
, Paulsen, supra note 5, at 691.
,?It will be noted that no recommendation is made that there be a
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In light of the serious theoretical and practical problems present in such statutes, the foundation upon which the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals based its holding in Flinn warrants
close scrutiny. The court began by citing extensively from State v.
5 and chastizing.the circuit court for its failure to
Harris,"
cite
Harris in ruling upon the constitutionality of the statute."8 In
Harris,the court held the contributing statute constitutional and
affirmed the conviction of the defendant for "contributing" because he kept the prosecutrix and her younger sister out until
eleven o'clock at night against her father's wishes."0 One authority
has classified Harrisas "an outrageous prosecution for contributing to the delinquency of a minor."2 In 1959 Harrisachieved national prominence when the drafters of the Model Penal Code, in
analyzing contributing statutes, determined that such statutes
should be dropped from the code because those statutes, "[w]ith
such far-reaching definitions of delinquency

. .

.[expanded] the

range of behavior prosecuted as contributing to delinquency [to
be] as broad as the whole penal code and more."2 The drafters
based that statement on ten separate state supreme court
decisions; Harriswas one of them.
statutory crime of 'contributing to the delinquency or neglect of a minor.'
Many of the 'contributing' statutes now on the books are phrased so
broadly that, when coupled with the equal broadness of the definition of
'delinquency' or 'neglect', the variety of types of adult conduct which
might be found to constitute criminal conduct are infinite and more than
are needed to protect children adequately. It seems sounder, therefore... to define the crime with greater certainty and to tie it to an act
which constitutes a violation of law or an omission to perform a duty
required by law. It is felt that the presently existing criminal statutes
define a sufficiently broad variety of crimes to serve as an adequate basis
to protect children.

Id., citing UNITED

STATES CHILDRENS BUREAU, STANDARDS FOR SPECIALIZED COURTS

DEALING WITH CHILDREN

35 (1954).

105 W. Va. 165, 141 S.E. 637 (1928). Specifically, the Flinn court quoted the
following relevant portions of Harris:"The crime of contributing to the delinquency
of a child is complete when acts are commited which directly tend to render the
child delinquent, and it is not necessary that the child who is the subject of the
crime shall be delinquent or shall oecome delinquent child." 208 S.E.2d at 541,
quoting 105 W. Va. at 168, 141 S.E. at 638; and "The Legislature could not possibly
inticipate [sic] and set out in words every particular act that might constitute the
offense." 208 S.E.2d at 541, quoting 105 W. Va. at 167, 141 S.E. at 639.
,1208 S.E.2d at 541.
2 105 W. Va. at 169, 141 S.E. at 639.
"

21 Mueller,Mens

Rea and the Law Without It, 58 W. VA. L. REv. 34, 54 (1955).

22MODEL PENAL CODE §

207.13, Comment 3 at 185 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
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Perhaps the sociological conditions as perceived by the court
in 1928 justified the decision in Harris,but Harris appears to be
somewhat less than relevant in 1974. The trial court may well have
been correct in ignoring the rule and reason of Harris.
Next, the court in Flinn stated that eighteen states, including
West Virginia, have interpreted contributing statutes; of these
eighteen, seventeen have held the statute constitutionally valid.,
The eighteenth state cited, Oregon, held its statute void as violative of the "delegation of powers" provision of the state constitution.24 The Oregon court, in State v. Hodges,2 did invalidate the
state's contributing statute because it violated a constitutional
prohibition against "delegation of power, ' 2 but the case has a
greater import than accorded it by the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals. The language of the Oregon court clearly indicates that it invalidated the statute not only because it was an
improper "delegation of power," but also because it was too vague
2
and indefinite.
" 208 S.E.2d at 541. The cases cited were: Anderson v. State, 384 P.2d 669
(Alas. 1963); Brockmueller v. State, 86 Ariz. 82, 340 P.2d 992 (1959); State v.
Barone, 124 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 1960); People v. Friedrich, 385 Il. 175, 52 N.E.2d 120
(1943); McDonald v. Commonwealth, 331 S.W.2d 716 (Ky. 1960); People v. Owens,
13 Mich. App. 469, 164 N.W.2d 712 (1968); State v. Johnson, 145 S.W.2d 468 (St.
Louis App. 1940); State v. Simants, 182 Neb. 491, 155 N.W.2d 788 (1968); State v.
Montalbo, 33 N.J. Super. 462, 110 A.2d 572 (1954); State v. McKinley, 53 N.M.
106, 202 P.2d 964 (1949); State v. Sparrow, 276 N.C. 499, 173 S.E.2d 897 cert.
denied, 403 U.S. 940 (1970); State v. Crary, 80 Ohio L. Abs. 417, 155 N.E.2d 262
(C.P., Lucas 1959); State v. Coterel, 97 Ohio App. 48, 123 N.E.2d 438 (1953); State
v. Hodges, 254 Ore. 21, 457 P.2d 491 (1969); Birdsell v. State, 205 Tenn. 631, 330
S.W.2d 1 (1959); State v. Tritt, 23 Utah 2d 365, 463 P.2d 806 (1970); State v.
Friedlander, 141 Wash. 1, 250 P. 453 (1926); State v. Harris, 105 W. Va. 165, 141
S.E. 637 (1928); Jung v. State, 55 Wisc. 2d 714, 201 N.W.2d 58 (1972).
24 208 S.E.2d at 541, citing State v. Hodges, 254 Ore. 21, 457 P.2d 491 (1969).
See also 72 W. VA. L. REv. 427 (1970).
2 254 Ore. 21, 457 P.2d 491 (1969).
21 Id. at 28, 457 P.2d at 494. There the court stated:
Such a statute not only creates a serious danger of inequality in the
administration of the criminal law, but it runs squarely contrary to the
purpose of Oregon Constitution, Art. I, § 21, which prohibits the delegation of legislative power.
The very looseness of the language of ORS 167.210 encourages the
prosecution to utilize the statute selectively to rid the community of
individuals deemed subjectively less desirable than other offenders. It is
the looseness of the language which offends due process and makes the
catchall clause of the statutean instrument of potentialabuse. (emphasis
added).
2

Id.
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A random selection" of the authority cited by the court in
Flinn demonstrates that the cases relied upon are less than persu0 the issue before the
asive. For example, in Anderson v. State,"
Alaska court was whether the lack of a definition of "immoral" as
used in the contributing statute rendered a section of that statute
unconstitutionally vague; the court found the section to be valid."
On the other hand, the Flinn opinion declared unconstitutional a
similar provision because the word "immoral" was too vague. 3' It
is difficult to imagine how the court in Flinn could utilize authority, the validity of which was repudiated by that court in the same
opinion.
In Brockmueller v. State," the Arizona court declared, "[t]he
statutes making it a misdemeanor to encourage delinquency of
[a] child and defining delinquency as any act tending to debase
or injure the morals, health or welfare of [a] child are sufficiently
certain and definite to apprise men of ordinary intelligence of the
conduct which the statutes prohibit. . .

."

However, the court in

Flinn invalidated the subsection of the West Virginia Code that
defined a delinquent as one who deports "himself so as to wilfully
injure or endanger the morals or health of himself or others
...

"' Again, the court repudiated the holding of a case which

it previously approved.
In State v. Crary,35 the Ohio court stated:
This language [tends to cause delinquency] is not as precise
as some might desire. Still, it seems to have been found precise
enough. It is no more unprecise than the common concept of
negligence. At any rate the law has proven workable and prac28 The selection of cases to be discussed was performed in the following manner: The author, prior to reading all nineteen cases cited in Flinn, chose seven cases
for special scrutiny. There was no conscious choice of which seven cases to initially
select. Of the seven cases chosen, three, for the obvious sake of brevity, were selected for specific discussion. The only one of the seven cases chosen for special
scrutiny that was substantially in accord with the decision in Flinn was State v.
Coterel, 97 Ohio App. 48, 123 N.E.2d 438 (1953).
2, 384 P.2d 669 (Alas. 1963).
Id. at 670.
31 208 S.E.2d at 549.
32 86 Ariz. 82, 340 P.2d

992 (1959).
3Id. at 82, 340 P.2d 993.
31 208 S.E.2d at 549, construingW. VA CODE ANN. §§ 49-1-4(9) (1966).
1 80 Ohio L. Abs. 417, 155 N.E.2d 262 (C.P., Lucas 1959).
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ticable, and nobody to date has offered a superior substitute to
accomplish its laudable aim. 36
The court in Crary appears to be relegating a criminal penalty to
the indefiniteness of the civil concept of negligence in direct contravention to the well-established rule that a criminal statute must
be most definite.37 Furthermore, the court seems to be saying that
since no one has come up with a better idea, why not keep the
contributing statute. Such strained reasoning does not appear to
be a particularly valid justification for upholding the contributing
statute in West Virginia.
In Flinn the West Virginia court made a lenghty analysis of
the "void for vagueness" doctrine, drawing a distinction between
those cases voiding statutes dealing with first amendment freedoms and those dealing with other areas. The court concluded a
stricter standard should be applied to statutes affecting first
amendment rights,3" and suggested that, according to Crary, there
are certain standards that need to be adhered to in construing a
contributing statute. These standards are: (1) the delinquency the
law is trying to prevent must be fairly evident; (2) it must be a
reasonably certain result of the act complained of; and (3) it must
be reasonably sure to befall a child within a reasonable time. "
After delineating these standards, the court applied them to
the West Virginia contributing statute" and considered it in para
materia4' with the statute defining the term delinquency;4" at this
point the court invalidated two subsections of the delinquency
definition. 3 The court interpreted the phrase "contributing to,"
suggested that it was merely a general criminal statute44 and,
therefore, was not necessarily void for vagueness.
Id. at 420, 155 N.E.2d at 264.
"A statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so
vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law." Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
' 208 S.E.2d at 543.
' Id. at 548.
,0W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-7-7 (1966).
" Pari Materia:Of the same matter; on the same subject; as, lawspari materia
must be construed with reference to each other. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1270 (rev.
4th ed. 1968).
" W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-1-4 (1966).
,1208 S.E.2d at 548-49.
" Id. at 550-52. This statement is particularly significant to the extent that the
court in Flinn differentiates between the rights one is granted by virtue of the first
"
"

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1975

7

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 78, Iss. 1 [1975], Art. 9

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78

The court thereupon reversed the circuit court on both questions certified for review, but the status of the three defendants,
Flinn, Barker, and Gentry, was left in doubt. Nothing in the seven
remaining subsections of the West Virginia delinquency statute,'
specifically covers the actions of these three defendants. The very
subsections under which the defendants were indicted were declared to be unconstitutional. Upon what grounds were the three
defendants still liable for prosecution? The inescapable conclusion
is that persons can still be prosecuted for "contributing" to the
delinquency of a minor with the word delinquency having some
meaning other than those set forth in the delinquency statute. If
this is the situation, no standards exist to which one may adhere
in attempting to stay within the bounds of the law. In the alternative, if only those actions specified in the seven remaining subsections of the delinquency statute are the actions which constitute
delinquency, the actions of the three defendants were no longer
necessary actions of a criminal nature." The court's specific approval of the indictments alleging only these "non-criminal" acts
apparently indicates that the former interpretation was adopted.
A final lingering question surrounds the court's analysis of the
word "contributing." The court found that the contributing statute, when read in pari materia with the delinquency statute, was
sufficiently specific and certain to provide adequate notice.' 7 Does
this mean that in those instances in which there exist criminal
penalties outside of the delinquency statute the phrase "contributing to" in the contributing statute is too vague? The answer is
unclear from this decision. The court said, "The vagueness or certainty of Code, 1931, 49-7-7, as amended, is not to be judged in the
abstract."" The combining of the terms of the delinquency statute
with the terms of the contributing statute should apparently clarify the confusion, but unfortunately, this analysis does not clarify
what one must do to avoid violating the constraints of "contributes
to, encourages or tends to cause." No definite guidelines have been
amendment and other rights not constitutionally protected when considering the
ambiguity of a general criminal statute. Id. at 543-46.
" W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-1-4 (1966). The two deleted sections were: (7) Associates with immoral or vicious persons; and (9) Deports himself so as to wilfully
injure or endanger the morals or health of himself or others.
11The defendantq were indicted for providing nonintoxicating beer to minors
and engaging in sexual relations with minors. 208 S.E.2d at 554.
,7 Id. at 553.

11Id. at 552.
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established by the court. No clear meaning of the above phrase has
been given to the man of "common intelligence."
One should be clearly appraised of the possible criminal liabilities to which he may be subjected. In order to avoid breaking the
law, one must be armed with the shield of knowledge. Knowledge
is the critical factor the court in Flinn failed to provide. The only
thing the instant decision made certain was the great uncertainty
already existing in a confused area of the law.
Michael Frank Pezzulli
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